





　本稿は、Ronald W. Langacker が提唱する「認知文法(Cognitive 
Grammar)」の理論の基盤となる「記号的文法観(symbolic view of 
grammar)」を再考することで、認知文法の思考法を考察することを目的
とする。Langacker の Foundations of Cognitive Grammar: Theoretical 
Prerequisites. (Vol.1)は1987年に Stanford University Press から正式に
刊行されたものであるが、その一部の章の草稿は既に空間文法
(Space Grammar)と呼ばれていた時代の1983年にIndiana University 
Linguistics Club から出されており、早くから言語の記号的側面
(symbolic view of language)が強調されている。また、1979年に
























[0] As its name implies, Cognitive Grammar is first and foremost 
a theory of grammar.







観(symbolic view of grammar)」を基本的精神のひとつに掲げる。2
[1] Language is symbolic in nature.  It makes available to the 
speaker̶for either personal or communicative use̶an open-ended 
set of linguistic signs or expressions, each of which associates 
a semantic representation of some kind with a phonological 
－ 59－
representation.
 (Langacker 1987: 11)
[2] I start from the obvious assumption that language is basically 
symbolic in nature.  It makes available to the speaker, for his own 
use or for purposes of communication with others, an open-ended 
linguistic signs or expressions each of which associates a semantic 
representation of some kind with a phonological representation.
(二重下線は原著による) (Langacker 1983: 6)
[3] CG's most fundamental claim is that grammar is symbolic 
in nature.  What does this mean, exactly?  Let us first define 
a symbol as the paring between a semantic structure and a 
phonological structure, such that one is able to evoke the other.
(Langacker 2008: 5)
[1]は1987年に Stanford University Press から正式に出版された認知



















[4] Language is shaped and constrained by the functions it 
serves.  These include the semiological function of allowing 
conceptualizations to be symbolized by means of sounds and 
gestures, as well as a multifaceted interactive function involving 






で 言 え ば“communicative use”、 ま た[2]で 言 え ば“purposes of 





















[5] […] the arbitrary character of linguistic signs is easily 
overstated […].  An obvious but seldom-made observation is that 
any polymorphemic linguistic sign (this includes the vast majority 
of expressions) is nonarbitrary to the extent that it is analyzable.
(角括弧内は對馬による、以下同様) (Langacker 1987: 12)
例えば、形態素レヴェルにおいて、computer はいわゆる「コンピュータ」
というゲシュタルト(gestalt)的意味をなす記号表現である。この類の V 






が、これは、complain (不満を漏らす) + -er (人)、つまり、V + -er
という部分に分析しても意味が推測できる合成的記号表現である。この種

















[6] Lexicon, morphology, and syntax form a continuum, divided 
























    Structure
(c) Symbolic
 Structure

























[7] In GC, a language is described as a structured inventory of 
conventional linguistic units.  The units (cognitive “routines”) 
comprising a speaker's linguistic knowledge are limited (by 
a restriction called by the content requirement) to semantic, 
phonological, and symbolic structures, or else emerge from such 
structures by the processes of abstraction (schematization) and 
categorization.
(Langacker 1999: 98)
[8] […] the grammar of a language is defined as those aspects 
of cognitive organization in which resides a speaker's grasp of 
established linguistic convention.  It can be characterized as a 













[9] […] grammar is meaningful.  […]  […] grammar allows us 
construct and symbolize the more elaborate meanings of complex 
expressions (like phrases, clauses, and sentences).  It is an essential 
aspect of the conceptual apparatus thorough which we apprehend 
and engage the world.
(Langacker 2008: 4)
[10] Consequences: (i) Grammar is not distinct from semantics 
but incorporates it as one pole. (ii) The elements of grammatical 
description are not special, irreducible primitives, but reduce to 










  a. naturalness  [自然さ]
  b. conceptual unification  [概念的統一]
  c. theoretical austerity  [理論の簡素さ]

















[13] Language is an integral part of human cognition.  An account 
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of linguistic structure therefore articulate with what is known 
about cognitive processing in general […].  […]  we have no valid 
reason to anticipate a sharp dichotomy between linguistic ability 
and other aspects of cognitive processing.
(Langacker 1987: 12)
Langacker によれば、言語は人間の認知機構の重要の一部を担うもので





姿勢を取る(cf. 對馬 2015)。さらに Langaker は認知能力について、つぎ
のように述べている。
[14] As for CG in particular, care is taken to invoke only well-
established or easily demonstrated mental abilities that are not 
exclusive to language.  We are able, for example, to focus and 
shift attention, to track a moving object, to form and manipulate 
images, to compare two experiences, to establish correspondences, 
to combine simple elements into complex structures, to view a 
scene from different perspectives, to conceptualize a situation at 




力には、焦点調整(to focus and shift attention)、視線移動(to track 
－ 68－
a moving object)、イメージ形成(to form and manipulate images)、
比較(to compare two experiences)、対応関係の確立(to establish 
correspondences)、 要 素 の 結 合(to combine simple elements into 
complex structures)、視点・観点(to view a scene from different 





[15] […] cognition̶or conceptual structure̶is essentially the 
same for speakers of all languages.  This is not to say that all 
speakers will conceive of the same things or have the same 
thoughts, only that conceptual structures have the same general 
character for all speakers, are constructed from the same inventory 
of primitive concepts, obey the same constraints, and are rather 









[16] Now some human faculty, some component within the overall 
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human psychological system, must be responsible for enumerating 
and characterizing conceptual structures[…].  It may be concluded 
that there is no clear division between grammatical and cognitive 
abilities, and that grammatical rules and cognition both operate on 





[17] […] meanings are the minds of the speakers who produce 
and understand the expressions.
(Lanagcker 2008: 27)
[18] Linguistic meaning resides in conceptualization, […].  […] 
Linguistic meaning involves both conceptual content and the 











[19] Language is an indispensable tool of thought, and we 
naturally tend to use the tools we have readily available when 
they suffice rather than make new ones, but we can and do fashion 
new tools as circumstances demand̶everyone does it many 
times every day in the creation of novel sentences and descriptive 
expressions.  People conceptualize, language does not.  People may 
use language to help them arrive at new conceptualizations, and 
then to label the conceptualizations they arrive at but language 













[20] To translate a conceived situation into linguistic terms, a 
speaker must select pertinent aspects of his current conceptual 
structures and cast them in a form appropriate for linguistic 












Langacker (1987)は“our ability to construe a conceived situation 



















①には「記号的文法観(symbolic view of grammar)」という名称が与









































いる(cf. Lanagcker 1983, 1987, 1991, 2008など)。(2)の「言語(の知識)
の獲得」については、「使用依拠モデル(Usage-Based Model)」の観点か





















































[25] […] language structure resides in cognitive processing, 
patterns of neural activation in the overall processing activity of 
the brain and the body. Insofar as possible, language is seen as 
recruiting incorporating other cognitive processes and systems ̶ 
memory, attention, perception, categorization, and so on. It follows 
that the theory and description of language, though driven by 



























[27] What is possible in physics (e.g. precise quantitative 
predictions) may not be possible in linguistics, which deals with 










[28] We thus make a fundamental distinction between competence (the 
speaker-hearer's knowledge of his language) and performance (the 




[29] To study language, then, we must attempt disassociate a 
variety of factors that interacts with underlying competence to 
determine actual performance; the technical term “competence” 
refers to the ability of the idealized speaker-hearer to associate 
sounds and meanings strictly in accordance with the rules of his 
language.  The grammar of language, as a model for idealized 
competence, establishes a certain relation between sound and 







ころの「有限の手段の無限の使用(“make infinite use of finite means” 
－ 79－
(Chomsky 2006: 18))」が実現される。
[30] So in fact, the two kinds of Merge that are possible are 
taking two things and putting them together or taking one thing 
and taking a piece of it and sticking it at the edge. […] External 
Merge is used, basically, to give you argument structure.  Internal 
Merge is basically used to give you discourse-related information, 
like focus, topic, new information, all that kind of stuff that relates 
to the discourse situation.




[31] […] language contains devices for generating sentences 
of arbitrary complexity.  Repetition of sentences is a rarity; 
innovation, in accordance with the grammar of the language, is 
the rule in ordinary day-by-day performance.  The idea that a 
person has a “verbal repertoire"̶a stock of utterances that he 
produces by “habit” on an appropriate occasion̶is a myth, totally 
at variance with the observed use of language.  Nor is it possible 
to attach any substance to the view that the speaker has a stock 





[32] There is of course no question that people have the capacity 
to learn a language, and that this involves innate structures and 
abilities.  What is controversial is whether some of these structures 
and abilities are unique to language, possibly constituting a 
separate module package with special properties not reflective 
or derivative of other, more general cognitive functions.  In my 







[33] usage-based approach:  Substantial importance is given to the 
actual use of the linguistic system and a speaker's knowledge of this 
use; the grammar is held responsible for a speaker's knowledge of 
the full range of linguistic conventions, regardless of whether these 
conventions can be subsumed under more general statements.  A 
nonreductive approach to linguistic structure that employs fully 
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[34] By the first definition, syntax (and more generally, grammar) 
is autonomous unless it is fully predictable in terms of meaning 
and other independent factors.  Let us call this weak autonomy. […] 
The second definition says that grammar is autonomous by virtue 
of being distinct from both lexicon and semantics, constituting 
a separate level of representation, whose description requires a 








[35] Autonomy Thesis: Grammar constitutes a separate, irreducible 
level of linguistic structure (one with its own constructs, 
representations, primitives, etc.) that is properly descried without 






[36] Symbolic Alternative: Grammar is inherently symbolic; only 





[37] Grammar (or syntax) does not constitute an autonomous 
formal level of representation.  Instead, grammar is symbolic in 










[38] A grammar of a language purports to be a description of the 
ideal speaker-hearer's intrinsic competence.  […]  A fully adequate 
grammar must assign to each of an infinite range of sentences a 
structural description indicating how this sentence is understood 
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[39] A grammar can be regarded as a theory of language; it is 
descriptively adequate to the extent that it correctly describes the 
intrinsic competence of the idealized native speaker.  […]  To the 
extent that a linguistic theory succeeds in selecting a descriptively 
adequate grammar on the basis of primary linguistic data, we can 
say that it meets the condition of explanatory adequacy.  That is, 
to this extent, it offers an explanation for the intuition of native 
speaker on the basis of an empirical hypothesis concerning the 
innate predisposition of the child to develop a certain kind of 




















[40] Within traditional linguistic theory, furthermore, it was 
clearly understood that one of the qualities that all languages 
have in common is their “creative” aspect.  Thus an essential 
property of language is that it provides the means for expressing 
indefinitely many thoughts and for reacting appropriately in 
an indefinite range of new situations […].  The grammar of a 
particular language, then, is to be supplemented by a universal 
grammar that accommodates the creative aspect of language use 
and expresses the deep-seated regularities which, being universal, 






[41] […] “the creative aspect of language use,” the distinctively 
human ability to express new thoughts and to understand entirely 
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[42] In particular, we have every reason to believe (and no real 
reason to doubt) that people are perfectly capable of conceiving 
entities and situations for which no standard linguistic expression 
is available; ‘linguistic creativity' in Chomskyan sense is basically 



























































































[43] a. They broke the vase into pieces.
　　 b. John hammered the metal flat.














[44] a. break: if you break something, you make it separate into 
two or more pieces, for example by hitting it, dropping it, 
or bending it
　　 b. hammer: to hit something with a hammer in order to force 
it into a particular position or shape
　　 c. push: to make someone or something move by pressing 
them with your hands, arms etc
(LDOCE5)
























[46] a. I danced myself tired.





[47] a. dance: to move your body to the sound and rhythm of 
music


























 2 Yamanashi (2016: XXII)では、認知文法のパラダイムの２つの主要
原理として、「記号的テーゼ(the symbolic thesis)」と「使用依拠的テー
ゼ (the usage-based thesis)」が挙げられており、これらは認知文法の
根幹をなす精神であることが述べられている。
 3 さ ら に、Langackerの1991年 の 著 作 で は“communicative 
function” (Lanagcker 1991: 1)とも呼ばれる。




 5 内容要件(content requirement)とはつぎのように定義される。
－ 94－
[A] […] the only elements ascribable to linguistic system are (i) 
semantic, phonological and symbolic structures that are actually 
occur as parts of expressions; (ii) schematizations of permitted 













(系統)発生」に関して、言及されつつある(cf. Chomsky 2016, Berwick 








[C] sanction: The motivation afforded a novel structure by the 
conventional unites of a grammar.  Full sanction involves an 
elaborative relationship (one of full schematicity) between the 
sanctioning unit and target structure; partial sanction involves a 
relationship of extension (or partial schematicity, in which there 
is some conflict in specifications).  Although partial sanction 
implies some degree of illformedness, a considerable degree of 
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